This document is a working paper of the Foreign and Security Policy Working Group of the Pirate Party Germany. Unless otherwise indicated, it does not represent an official position or statement of the Pirate Party.
1. Presentation of The Status Quo
On January 8, 2020, the Ukrainian passenger plane en route from Tehran to Kiev was shot down by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards shortly after take-off. Protests then erupted in Iran against the Guards as well as the Iranian government.3 International protests erupted in September 2020 following the execution of popular Iranian wrestler Navid Afkari, whom the government accused of killing a security guard during the 2018 protests. Among other things, there were calls for Iran to be banned from international sporting events.4
Since July 16, 2020, the military conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, previously considered a frozen flashpoint, has flared up again between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Iranian government views this with great concern, especially with regard to the Azeri population, which makes up the second largest population group in Iran after the Persians.5
Due to this weakened position of Iran, there have been repeated calls, especially from Western experts with Iranian backgrounds, for the West to support Iran in a “regime change” in 2020.6
However, Kenneth M. Pollak also pointed out that despite Corona and external and internal pressures, it is rather unlikely that the previous Iranian system will collapse under the pressure and there will be a direct regime change.7
Already on May 30, 2018, Michael McFaul, former “Special Assistant” at the National Security Council under Barack Obama, and Abbas Milani, Co-Director of the Iran Democracy Project at the Hoover Institution, pointed out in an opinion piece in the Washington Post that the “working poor,” who have been a very important pillar of the current political system throughout the years of the Islamic Republic, are now taking to the streets due to the pressures caused by Corona and the economic sanctions. However, all the democratic forces in Iran that want Iran to change from within are also strong supporters and defenders of the Iran deal, which was unilaterally scrapped by the U.S. administration led by President Donald Trump. The authors conclude that an under leadership change of the regime is only a matter of time and the current pressure from the U.S. side will only bring Iran closer to Russia and China.8
The election of Joe Biden as the 46th president of the United States has created a new foreign policy opportunity for Iran. For new talks with the U.S., Iran is demanding a return to the so-called “Iran deal.” After the end of Donald Trump’s presidency, the Iranian government can now return to the negotiating table with the U.S. without the accusation of having yielded to external pressure. Initial talks began as early as February 2021. For Iranian politics, the philosophical concept of “nafs” is crucial at this point.9 Very briefly, this is understood to mean that any Iranian government that voluntarily submits to an external power has lost its legitimacy among the population and the various elites in the country.10 This is thus similar to the Chinese concept of the “mandate of heaven.” Since the beginning of the 20th century, China, like Iran and with its 1979 of “Greater Iran,” to find its own political and cultural responses to dynamics by external actors under similar conditions.11
On April 16, 2020, Benjamin Denzin rightly pointed out in a commentary on the topic that while regime change from the outside is tempting for actors in the United States. However, the unintended consequences of such U.S. action would be dramatic. A look at Iran’s recent history shows this clearly.
During the Cold War period, when the U.S. and the Soviet Union were fighting for global dominance, Iran was one of the most important battlefields for both superpowers due to its strategically important location. The “Cold War anxiety” and focus on Iran at the time came from the fact that the Soviet Union, along with the British, occupied Iran during World War II. In August 1941, British and Soviet troops invaded Iran and forced Reza Shah, who had founded the Pahlavi dynasty in 1925, to abdicate on September 16, 1941, and expelled him. He died in exile in South Africa in 1944.12
On January 29, 1942, in the so-called “Three-Power Agreement” between Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the Iranian government under Mohammed Reza Shah, it was agreed that the Allied troops would leave Iran no later than six months after the end of the war. Also, at the Tehran Conference in 1943, the U.S., Britain and the Soviet Union guaranteed Iran’s territorial integrity and independence and confirmed the planned withdrawal of troops. However, the Soviet Union under Stalin refused to withdraw its troops from northern Iran in 1945. It tried to expand its influence in Iran in the so-called “Iran crisis.”
In July 1945, Stalin ordered the support of separatist forces in Iran. Thus, a secession of the northern provinces in Iran was to be prepared.13
As a result, the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan and the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad were created. After the Soviet Union, under U.S. pressure, withdrew its troops from the Iranian north in May 1946, the two established Soviet satellite states collapsed. This was the prelude to the ensuing Cold War between the superpowers. Iran was forced during the British and Soviet occupation to readmit the Communist Party, which had been banned in 1937. On October 2, 1941, the Tudeh Party of Iran was formed in the Iranian capital. This became part of the opposition movements against the Iranian monarchy, later contributing to the 1979 revolution.
In 1949, the Shah had a constitutional amendment authorize him to dissolve Parliament. That same year, an upper house was created, half of whose 60 members he appointed himself. However, with the election of the leader of the National Front party alliance, Mohammed Mossadegh, as prime minister, conflict with the shah soon arose. On May 1, 1951, Mossadegh announced the nationalization of Iran’s oil industry, which until then had been controlled by the British, in order to keep the money from the oil business in the country. The result was a boycott of Iran by almost all international oil companies and a financial crisis in the country. Nevertheless, he was granted special powers by Parliament for twelve months.14
With these special powers, the Mossadegh government also attempted to carry out land reform. This also affected the shah’s lands. Likewise, the shah was prohibited from maintaining independent diplomatic contacts. Foreign policy was now to be the sole responsibility of the Foreign Ministry.15
Britain saw this power struggle and the changes in Iran as a threat to its influence in the region. They turned to the United States to gain support for their policy against the Mossadegh government. The nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was a loss to British influence in the country. The CIA organized a coup against the nationalist Iranian government in 1953. Mossadegh was placed under house arrest. However, this coup was to unite large sections of the Iranian opposition now against the Americans. Both the now increasingly strong political and cultural influence of the U.S. in Iran in the years following the coup and the opposition’s hostility toward the U.S. were one of the foundations of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which united very different political groups to jointly overthrow the Shah. 16
There are various elites and power groups in Iran. These do not consist exclusively of the high clergy. However, it is this group of clerics that has been particularly hard hit by deaths from the Corona pandemic. For example, Ayatollah Hashem Bathayi Golpayegani, a member of the Council of Experts in Iran, died in March 2020. By that time, at least 12 politicians who were in or out of office had died of SARS-CoV-2 in Iran.17
Criticism of the status quo had already begun to emerge among the next generation of Shiite clergy in previous years. The erosion of the Islamic Republic’s ideological foundation is also given by the fact that the younger generation is increasingly turning to the pre-Islamic and thus clearly Iranian spiritual heritage. This is a threat to the current status quo of power.18
Nevertheless, there is little that religious leaders can do about it because this thinking is so deeply embedded in the general mindset of the people of Iran and, beyond that, in the “Greater Iran” cultural region.
The criticism of the social situation and the “betrayal of the social ideals” of the revolution, heard again and again over the years of the Islamic Republic’s existence, also accompanied it from the beginning. On closer inspection, this “revolution” is more of a transformation. The fact that the impression of Iraq’s war of aggression against Iran (First Gulf War), which was supported by the West, helped to stabilize and to radicalize the current political system is not taken into account. and radicalize the current political system is often ignored. After the blow-back of 1979, the United States gave further momentum to the “Islamic Revolution” so that, contrary to the expectations of contemporary observers at the time, the balance of power in Iran could hold until today.
The Iranian middle class, which had hitherto benefited from the Islamic Republic, had already come under economic and social pressure before the Corona pandemic, but remained aloof from the demonstrations against the government experienced during the so-called “Green Movement.” This changed with the demonstrations in January 2020.19
For the current Iranian government, the political concept of balance, which is deeply rooted in history, is important. By involving various power and interest groups in the country, it guarantees, like the balance, every Iranian government(s) before it retains power.20 21
2. Change in Iran – A Field of Tension
Due to the Corona pandemic, the Middle East is in a very unstable environment. Change in Iran is therefore a stress test, not least because of the Iranians’ historical experience, which is reminiscent of the situation in 1979 and the ensuing war with Iraq.22
The greatest external threat to change in Iran is certainly Turkey under President Erdogan. The Turkish president is in a difficult situation domestically. He is trying to distract attention from domestic problems with various smaller conflicts in which he challenges regional actors. As a result, he has become an incalculable foreign policy actor. Turkish actions in Syria and Libya, as well as the gas dispute in the Mediterranean,23 bring it into conflict with Iran on many levels.24,25
Iran is trying to deal with the conflicts in its near environment by trying to establish military dominance in the region, as it did during the Shah’s time.26
However, based on its experience in the war with Iraq, the Islamic Republic has adopted a more asymmetric response at both the strategic and tactical levels. Contrary to popular belief, there is continuity in the strategic thinking of the security apparatus despite the revolution. As an example, consider the transformation of SAVAK, the former intelligence agency during the Shah’s time, to the new and current Iranian intelligence agency, VEVAK.27
Hussein Fardust was a close confidant of the Shah and deputy director of SAVAK. He was tasked by the Revolutionary Council to establish the successor organization, of which he served as the first director. Thus, old rope lines and ways of thinking from the Shah’s time were continued and the doctrine of the Islamic Republic was shaped. This is comparable to the “Gehlen Organization” formed by the CIA from former Wehrmacht officers and NSDAP members, from which the BND developed.
Currently, in the official Iranian legitimation and communication more and more a change can be observed, which is often overlooked. Thus, on October 24, 2019, the Iranian “Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance” stated in a message that the birthday of the Prophet Zarathustra will be included in the official calendar.28
An important indicator of what is to come in Iran is the brief unusual protests around the turn of 2017/2018, which began in the country’s conservative strongholds, which was unusual.29
They were seen at the outset as an attempt by conservative forces to obstruct the government’s economic policy reforms. It must not be forgotten that also because of the experiences during the Shah’s time, the “Islamic revolution” had a very strong component toward social justice. Likewise, in the early days of Ayatollah Khomeini, his criticism of the Shah was focused on this issue, among others.30
The Shah attempted to defuse social tensions through the “White Revolution,” a six-point reform program aimed at rapidly modernizing Iran. This failed to involve the various interest groups. This policy led to the 1963 popular uprising against the U.S.-reinstated Shah 10 years after the end of the Mossadegh government, which had been overthrown by the CIA.31
Much construction took place during this period, which was strongly welcomed and supported by the New Western-influenced (educational) elites in the country. However, the building frenzy with new, modern construction similar to that in the Gulf states threatened to cause the historically evolved cityscapes in Iran to disappear. This was only ended by a law passed in 1968.32 State officials and police officers also remained excluded from oil wealth.33
The question of whether Iran should be opened up quickly in terms of economic policy or whether it would be better to act more cautiously so as not to become politically dependent through international economic relations was already the area of tension in which Iranian economic policy moved in the first post-revolutionary years.34
The similar situation can be found again today in the context of the urgently needed economic reforms in the debate within Iran.35 The current question of how to modernize and orient the economy accordingly can be seen in the echo of these brief developments at the time, which quickly culminated in the Islamic Revolution.36 This legacy and conflict will continue even after a change in Iran. The economic power of the Revolutionary Guards37 in Iran also serves to make Iran economically self-sufficient and resilient despite sanctions policies.38
In the course of the “White Revolution,” Iran asked the USA for wheat supplies in 1961. In return, the Kennedy administration forced the Shah to dismantle Iran’s large landholdings and rural structures.39
Thus, it began to expropriate the land of the then large landowners. With the hasty reform, the Shah thus caused massive political and social problems. During the last 10 years before the revolution, Iran was forced to change from a country that could export food to an importing country. The clergy criticized this and spoke of the peasants having “lost their souls.” During this period, Iran’s irrigation systems had also fallen into disrepair due to the pressures of the time and the exodus of the rural population to the cities triggered by modernization imposed from above.40
These political experiences of the time are far from over. They are at the root of both the general distrust of Iran’s elites toward hasty free trade and toward concessions that could quickly turn out to be a boomerang for the country. A repeat of these developments could now be observed again in the 2017/2018 protests in Iran.41 Thus, the current currency reform of the Iranian rial against the toman,42 which is a historical designation for Iranian currencies, can send multiple signals. Alone the official denomination of a currency of a state, can mean a message for the state perception.
Because of the experience under the Shah’s government and also the war with Iraq, the pursuit of economic and military modernization is an important constant in Iranian politics. This policy will continue to some extent even as the country changes. Again, conflicts and tensions will arise over the respective priority of each policy area. Early on, China experienced something similar in its efforts to modernize its army. Here, attempts were made to reduce the economic influence, which came at the expense of conventional strike capability.43
The country’s cultural heritage remains an important political asset today in Iran and beyond in the cultural region of “Greater Iran. “44 Donald Trump’s threat to attack important historical and cultural targets45 had therefore caused strong concern among many Iranians at home and abroad. An attack on these sites would have rallied even many Iranian exiles critical to hostile of the current Iranian government after an attack on cultural assets, such as the son-in-law of the last Shah Ardeshir Zahedi, who lives in exile in London.46
The very fundamentally grounded tension of history and, culture continues to dominate power politics and the behaviour of actors in the country who are aware of its impact. This is too often left out of Western analyses. This leads to the fact that cognitive distortions like Belief Bias, Confirmation Bias and in a certain way a “turkey illusion” can follow. One experienced this with the change in the communist states in 1989, which greatly surprised most Western analysts at the time.47
Yet the signs at the time were discernible. Interestingly, the human factor of the analysts and their interaction, as described by David Engermann in his 2004 contribution to the history of Soviet studies in the U.S. during the Cold War,48 also the political and generational conflicts from the 1960s onward were additional factors that increasingly influenced analyses and perceptions within and outside the discipline.49
One currently experiences something similar when it comes to analyses of Iran. For example, Mark Silinsky recently analyzed the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in comparison with the SS during the Nazi era and the Soviet KGB.50
These comparisons lead to distorted perceptions and conclusions about Iran and its actions. For example, in Iran, the actions of IS and Al-Qaeda, which are hostile to any pre-Islamic monuments, have been closely and critically observed. The Taliban were initially critical of Al-Qaeda’s demand to destroy Bamiyan Buddha statues. Nevertheless, in late March 2001, the demand was conceded and the monuments were destroyed. Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban at the time, said in an interview in 2004 that the Taliban only carried this out because of pressure from foreign Islamists.51
This shows the importance that the country’s culture and history still have, and thus are more significant to rational action than any supposed ideology.
After the Iran deal, the Iranian government attempted to open up and modernize Iran in terms of economic policy. Conservative forces were strong critics of this approach. Contrary to what is assumed in Western analyses; however, these forces do not see only their own power in danger; the historical experiences from the pre-revolutionary period are still very present in the consciousness of Iranian society. Iranian youth called for the long-dead Reza Shah.52
This first Shah of the Pahlevi dynasty and father of the overthrown last Shah, had modernized Iran at the beginning of the 20th century against opposition in the country and saw Atatürk as his great role model. He wanted Iran to stand up to the hegemonic powers of the time, i.e. Great Britain and Russia, and later the Soviet Union, which had dominated Iran until then. To this end, he brought experts from Germany, which had always had close relations with Iran, into the country. This led to Iran being occupied until the end of the Second World War. This still reflects the aforementioned concept of “nafs” today.
3. Foreign Policy Conclusion
Donald Trump strongly criticized the deal with Iran very early in his election campaign and followed through on that criticism by withdrawing the United States from the Vienna agreement in 2018. The United States’ main rival for “leading the world” is China. As early as 1994, Zerbegniv Bzrinski in the book “the Only World Power” 1994, had advocated that the United States needed a partner in Iran to contain Russia and both parties, Iran and the United States, have many obvious common interests in the region.53
The Chinese “Belt and Road” initiative is dependent on Iran and the cultural area of “Greater Iran,” where the state of Iran has a decisive dominance.54 Thus, the political adversary may have changed, but the political importance of Iran for the United States has remained.
The U.S. administration of Donald Trump at the time had visibly signalled early on that it wanted to withdraw from the Middle East.55 Commenting on Bolton’s ejection, Trump said.
“Bolton wanted a war against Iran, which he prevented.” In addition, Bolton would have had personal differences with many people.56 Iran’s religious leader commented on Twitter on January 9, 2019, in reference to Bolton that “the latter is an idiot” and that the political system in Iran is still in place, contrary to Bolton’s efforts.57
The U.S. has been negotiating with the Taliban in secret since 2019 in advance of its withdrawal from Afghanistan.58 Despite the announced “failure,” the U.S. and the Taliban appear to have sealed cooperation against IS, according to a report in the Washington Post.59 A similar deal had already been seen between Iran and the U.S. in the fight against IS in Iraq in advance of the deal with Iran. Iran had already after September 11 through the Swiss embassy, offered the U.S. an agreement on their areas of conflict. However, this was rejected by the USA.60
In the run-up to the official negotiations between the U.S. and Iran that led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, there were secret negotiations between the U.S. and Iran mediated by Oman.61 However, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is focused only on the nuclear program. While the U.S. withdrew from the deal two years after it was announced, it is interesting to note that (according to sources) Donald Trump had considered giving Iran a $15 billion loan as a bailout in September 2019,62 while at the same time the U.S. was imposing sanctions on Iran. The United States had also made major concessions to North Korea under the Trump administration. This led to the historic meeting between Kim Yong Un and Donald Trump at the demarcation line. The U.S. withdrawal from South Korea is now forcing the two Korean states to approach each other more.
A more closely allied or even unified Korea in possession of nuclear weapons would have major strategic challenges to offer China.63 In the meantime, the Trump administration had announced the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, creating facts as early as fall 2020.64 In addition, the Trump administration had announced a new “deal” with Iran in September 2020.65 Both the troop withdrawal and the resumption of talks for a new Iran deal are now being pursued by the Biden administration. Thus, for Iran, similar to the two Koreas, new opportunities present themselves.
Meanwhile, Iran’s leadership is placed in a difficult position. The assassination of nuclear scientist Fachrisadeh in November 2020 and the renewed incident at the Natans nuclear facility are blamed on Israel, prompting calls for retaliation. On the other hand, any overreaction would hurt Iran in terms of relations with the new Biden administration. Therefore, Iran will wait and see.66 Despite current criticism by the Iranian government of the Gulf states’ agreements with Israel,67 there are currently significant signs in Iran itself of a change in its view of Israel.68 Even Hezbollah has recently not completely closed its mind to a peace plan between Lebanon and Israel. Despite all scepticism, talks between Israel and Lebanon have begun, which would be impossible without Hezbollah’s acquiescence.69
It is worth noting here that Donald Trump had also implemented the announcements he made during the election campaign, particularly with regard to the Middle East. The current developments could be openly recognizable to all, but are not perceived due to the various biases. It would be a “staircase joke of history” if a deal were implemented before the eyes of the world public that was transparent and publicly readable and traceable on Twitter in many aspects of its creation and implementation, but was overlooked due to habits. The conclusion about it, however, would be left to posterity.
Until then, the United Arab Emirates present themselves at the latest with their pioneering role in the so-called “Abraham Agreements” on the normalization of relations between several Arab states and Israel as a driving force of Middle Eastern politics. As Volker Perthes writes in January 2021, these normalization agreements, negotiated with Trump’s participation, are among the geopolitically significant changes of the past four years. He goes on to argue that more intensive cooperation between the Arab Gulf states and Israel will eventually shift the regional balance of power to Iran’s disadvantage and also provide reassurance should the United States further reduce its involvement in the Middle East. Thus, it now depends on Biden’s administration whether the so-called Abraham Accords will contribute to a truly constructive policy in the conflict region that will subsequently affect Iran. Biden’s plans for the Middle East and Iran in particular are not yet clear. While on the one hand there is the prospect of an easing of economic sanctions against Iran through the resumption of talks on the nuclear deal, on the other hand Biden has pro-Iranian militias bombing in Syria. Either way, it is clear that the political cards in the region are being reshuffled.
1) Middle East Eye: Iran‘s coronavirus death toll exceeds 24,000, says health ministry, 19. September 2020
https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/irans-coronavirus-death-toll-exceeds-24000-says-health-ministry
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2) Davoodi, Schoresch: Iran -Current situation in the Middle East – Lecture for Pirate SecurityConference 2020
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https://www.piratenpartei.de/2020/01/20/irans-proteste-gegen-die-revolutionsgarden-eine-einschaetzung/
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4) RP-Online: Entsetzen nach Hinrichtung von iranischem Ringer Afkari, 12. September 2020,
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6) Edelman, Eric S & Takeyh, Ray; The Next Iranian Revolution, in; Foreign Affairs 15. April 2020
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2020-04-13/next-iranian-revolution
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7) Pollack, Kenneth M.: The Coronavirus Won’t Kill the Islamic Republic, in Foreign Policy 2. April2020
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8) McFaul, Michael & Abbas Milani: Why Trump’s plans for regime change in Iran will have the opposite effect, in: Washington Post, 30. Mai 2018
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/05/30/why-trumps-plans-for-regime-change-in-iran-will-have-the-opposite-effect/?noredirect=on
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9) Majd, Hoomad: Pride and Prejudice in Tehran, in: Foreign Policy 16. Juli 2018
10) Davoodi, Schoresch: Iran – Now and the future – Lecture for Pirate Security Conference 2018
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https://www.piratenpartei.de/2019/09/15/ist-hongkong-zu-fortschrittlich-fuer-china/
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12) Gronke, Monika: Irans Geschichte: 1941-1979 – Vom Zweiten Weltkrieg bis zur Islamischen Revolution, auf Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 8. Januar 2020
https://www.bpb.de/internationales/asien/iran/40125/irans-geschichte-1941-bis-1979 12.12.20
13) Secret Soviet Instructions on Measures to Carry out Special Assignments throughout Southern Azerbaijan and the Northern Provinces of Iran in an attempt to set the basis for a separatist movement in Northern Iran,14. Juli 1945 https://mashruteh.org/wiki/images/f/f1/Secret_Soviet_Instructions_on_Measures_to_Carry_out_Special_Assignments_throughout_Southern_Azerbaijan_and_the_Northern_Provinces_of_Iran_in_an_attempt_to_set_the_basis_for_a_separatist_movement_in_Northern_Iran.pdf 12.12.20
14) Gronke, Monika: Irans Geschichte: 1941-1979 – Vom Zweiten Weltkrieg bis zur Islamischen Revolution, auf Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung
15) Ebd.
16) Denison, Benjamin: Stay Out of the Regime Change Business, War on the Rocks 16. Juni 2020
https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/stay-out-of-the-regime-change-business/
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17) New Straits Time: Top Iran cleric dies of Covid-19, 16. März 2020
https://www.nst.com.my/world/world/2020/03/575089/top-iran-cleric-dies-covid-1912.12.20
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21) Davoodi, Schoresch: Iran – Now and the future
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24) Kohler, Alexander: Hintergründe zum Berg Karabach Konflikt, auf: Piratenpartei Deutschland,25. November 2020
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26) Iddon, Paul: In the 1970s the Shah sought to make Iran a military superpower, auf: Offiziere.ch9. September 2018
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27) Henner Fürtig: Die Islamische Republik Iran. 1987. S. 121
28) Karimi, Azadeh: Official Iranian Calendar to Include Prophet Zoroaster’s Birthday, Minister Says- Kayhan Life 24. Oktober 2019
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29) Keath, Lee: Iran’s working class, facing dim prospects, fuels unrest, AP 6. Januar 2018
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https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-0f6r-pf24
31) Schweizer, Gerhard: Iran Drehscheibe zwischen Ost und West, Frankfurt am Main 1991, S. 294f
32) Ebd. S. 287f
33) Ebd. S. 289
34) Encke Ulrich; Ayatollah Khomeini, München 1989, S.157f
35) Thierry, Coville: The Economic Activities of the Pasdaran », Revue internationale des étudesdu développement, 2017/1 (N° 229), S. 91-111. DOI : 10.3917/ried.229.0091
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36) Encke Ulrich; Ayatollah Khomeini, S. 26
37) Thierry, Coville: The Economic Activities of the Pasdaran
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39) Nussbaum, Heinz: Khomeini, München 1979, S. 99
40) bd. S. 100
41) Waldman, Scott: Climate Change May Have Helped Spark Iran’s Protests, auf: ScientificAmerican, 8. Januar 2018
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42) Salehi-Isfahani, Djavad: Iran’s economic reforms in retreat, 4. Dezember 2018
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2018/12/04/irans-economic-reforms-in-retreat/
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https://www.offiziere.ch/?p=36999
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45) Levenston, Eric: Trump‘s threatened attack on Iranian cultural sites could be a war crime ifcarried out auf CNN.com, 6. Januar 2020
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46) Majd, Hooman: If Trump knew anything about Iran, he would never have threatened itsculture, in: Washington Post, 8. Januar 2020
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/01/08/if-trump-knew-anything-about-iran-he-would-never-have-threatened-its-culture/
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47) Engerman, David C. “The Ironies of the Iron Curtain: The Cold War and the Rise of RussianStudies in the United States.” Cahiers Du Monde Russe, vol. 45, no. 3/4, 2004, S. 465–496. JSTOR,
www.jstor.org/stable/20174867
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48) bd. S. 491ff
49) bd. S. 495f
50) Silinsky, Mark: Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps: Its Similarities to the Soviet KGB and the German SS and Gestapo, in: The Journal for Interdisciplinary Middle Eastern StudiesVolume 6,No.1, Spring 2020, S. 5-35
51) The Rediff: Interview mit Mullah Omar, 12. April 2004
https://www.rediff.com/news/2004/apr/12inter.htm
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52) Etezadosaltaneh, Nozhan: Why are Iranians Chanting “Reza Shah”?, in: International Policy Digest, 5. Januar 2018
https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/01/05/why-iranians-chanting-reza-shah/
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53) Davoodi, Schoresch: Der Iran Aufstieg eines „westlichen Parias“?, Pirate Security Conference2015
54) Davoodi, Schoresch: Iran -Current situation in the Middle East, S. 2
55) Tisdall, Simon: Why instinct and ideology tell Trump to get out of the Middle East, in: The Guardian 11. Januar 2020
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jan/11/why-instinct-and-ideology-tell-trump-to-get-out-of-the-middle-east-suleimani-iran
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56) CNN: Trump slams Bolton as Senate considers calling him as a witness, 29. Januar 2020
https://edition.cnn.com/2020/01/29/politics/donald-trump-john-bolton/index.html
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57) https://twitter.com/schwerin_von/status/1082954055276732417?s=20
58) New York Times: How Trump’s Plan to Secretly Meet With the Taliban Came Together, and FellApart, 8. September 2019
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/08/world/asia/afghanistan-trump-camp-david-taliban.html
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59) Washington Post: Our secret Taliban air force -Inside the clandestine U.S. campaign to helpour longtime enemy defeat ISIS, 20. Oktober 2020
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/10/22/taliban-isis-drones-afghanistan/?arc404=true
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60) PBS: Showdown with Iran – The „Grand Bargain“-Fax a missed Opportunity? 23. Oktober2007
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/showdown/themes/grandbargain.html
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61) Tasnin News Agency: Iran Congratulates Oman on National Day, 19.November .2020
https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2020/11/19/2392501/iran-congratulates-oman-on-national-day
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62) Choi, David: Trump is reportedly considering throwing a $15 billion lifeline to Iran, in: BusinessInsider, 12. September 2019
https://www.businessinsider.nl/trump-deal-iran-15-billion-nuclear-france-2019-9?international=true&r=US
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63) Girard, Bonnie: Would Korean Reunification Threaten China?, in: The Diplomat 23. Juni 2018
https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/would-korean-reunification-threaten-china/
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64) Tagesschau: Trump schafft mit Truppenabzug Fakten, 17. November 2020
https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/us-abzug-afghanistan-105.html
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65) The Arab Weekly: Iran threatens Arab peacemakers, Trump predicts later deal with Tehran, 16.September 2020, https://thearabweekly.com/iran-threatens-arab-peacemakers-trump-predicts-later-deal-tehran
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66) Magnier, Elijah J.: How will Iran answer the assassination of Fakhri Zadeh?, 29.11.2020
https://ejmagnier.com/2020/11/29/how-will-iran-answer-the-assassination-of-fakhri-zadeh/
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67) Behravesh, Mysam & Azizi, Hamidreza: Israel’s Peace Deals Are a Strategic Nightmare for Iran,in Foreign Policy 14. September 2020
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/14/israels-peace-deals-are-a-strategic-nightmare-for-iran/
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68) Knipp, Kerstin: Teherans Israel-Feindschaft in der Kritik, in: Deutsche Welle 19.10.2020
https://www.dw.com/de/teherans-israel-feindschaft-in-der-kritik/a-55325471
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69) Hechel, Daniel: Gespräche zwischen Israel und Libanon – Meilenstein auf dem Weg der Annäherung, Tagesschau.de 14.10.2020
https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/israel-libanon-friedensgespraeche-101.html
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