Ukraine Conflict: We Cannot Afford to Remain Neutral – AG-AusPol

What is at stake?

For a little over two weeks, there have been increasing reports of Russian troops deploying along the borders with Ukraine, the so-called “people’s republics” of the “separatists” in eastern Ukraine and in Crimea, which was annexed by Moscow. Videos on social media show deployments of battle tanks, armoured artillery, and engineer tanks on platoons and columns of infantry fighting vehicles, troop carriers, and field artillery. Other videos show combat helicopters, anti-aircraft systems, and logistical equipment such as tanker trucks and mobile hospitals. Although the date and location of the footage cannot be proven beyond doubt in every case, the images as a whole speak a clear language. The weapon systems transported there, including the associated logistics, do not speak for a territorially limited deployment. The Russian newspaper “Kommersant”, which is critical of the government, even reported that transport capacities for civilian goods are becoming increasingly scarce in view of the massive deployment. To make matters worse, the OSCE monitoring mission also reported a renewed increase in the number of cease-fire violations and deployments of heavy weapons in areas not controlled by the government. The Russian side does not deny this in principle. Instead, Moscow points to maneuvers that have been planned for some time and to the fact that it can move military equipment on its territory at its own discretion. In addition, an alleged Ukrainian deployment makes it necessary to intensify defensive measures. What remains unclear, however, is the objective of the Russian mobilization.

However, a direct Ukrainian attack on Russian territory is more than unlikely given the clear imbalance of forces. A threat from NATO’s Defender Europe 2021 exercise can also be ruled out, since it is not even taking place in Ukraine. The Russian side occasionally refers to the Ukrainian President’s Decree 117/2021 on the implementation of the decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine of March 11, 2021. This includes the implementation of a strategy document on “de-occupation and reintegration of the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol.” However, anyone who reads the document carefully will see that it does not envisage any armed reintegration, but rather reaffirms a series of administrative measures that have been practiced anyway since Russia’s military occupation of Crimea. For the most part, these are merely theoretical measures – such as the prosecution of human rights violations and other rights abuses in Crimea, which was occupied in violation of international law – that are currently factually unfeasible for Ukraine. No actual threat of any kind to Russia arises from the strategy paper.

Possible motives

Putin’s most obvious motivation is to be found in Russian domestic politics. Parliamentary elections will be held in Russia in the fall. According to polls, his party, United Russia, is threatened with a loss of votes. It is therefore convenient for Putin to present himself as a strong man. It is equally likely that the Russian government’s measures are aimed at testing the resolve of the newly elected U.S. administration. Thus, their counter-reactions will determine which more far-reaching strategic goals the Russian government is pursuing. There are various theories on these.

One is that provoking military clashes between the Ukrainian military and the “separatists” supported financially and militarily by Russia could accelerate the integration of the so-called “people’s republics” into the Russian Federation. It is conceivable, for example, that Russian troops will be stationed in the occupied territories in the future for peacekeeping purposes, thereby justifying the presence of the Russian military. For example, Russian media such as the semi-state-run, pro-government “Perwy Kanal” (“First Channel”) have for days been spreading the story of the alleged death of a boy in the occupied territories by a drone attack by Ukrainian troops. There is no proof of this. Nevertheless, Moscow threatens to intervene to prevent “human catastrophes.” Moreover, Moscow has been distributing hundreds of thousands of Russian passports to the population in the Donbass for months, while stressing the need to protect the security of the (now) Russian population. A “cry for help” from the Moscow-dependent and internationally unrecognized “people’s republics” could also serve as a justification for both territories’ accession to the Russian Federation, which would later be sham-legitimized by an alleged referendum along Crimea’s lines.

Crimea itself could also be the reason for the current Russian deployment. For example, the peninsula has been suffering from increasing water shortages since its annexation in 2014 in violation of international law. The reason for this is that the Ukrainian authorities have now blocked the North Crimean Canal – which used to supply up to 85% of Crimea’s water needs. In principle, therefore, it would also be conceivable that a push all the way to the Dnieper River would solve the water shortage problem. The establishment of a land connection from the “Donetsk People’s Republic” via the port city of Mariupol and Melitopol to the isthmus of Perekop is also likely to be in Russia’s long-term interest. In contrast to the unclear situation in 2014, however, these goals can currently only be achieved through open military intervention, in which case Russia would have to expect sensitive countermeasures from the international community. Consequently, other motives, such as the breakup of Ukraine and the separation of the part around the cities of Kharkiv, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhya and Odessa that is referred to as “Novorossiya,” do not seem very realistic at present. It is possible that Putin, whom the Tagesspiegel recently described as an “opportunistic thief,” himself does not yet know how far he will go. The decisive factor will be how far the West allows him to go.

The ball is in Europe’s court

This raises the question of how the Western community of nations should position itself with regard to Russia’s actions. While U.S. President Biden and his British counterpart Johnson have clearly sided with Ukraine, the German foreign minister, together with his French counterpart, issued a joint statement expressing “support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” addressing Russian troop movements, but at the same time calling on the unspecified “parties to exercise restraint and immediate de-escalation.” Germany, in particular, has so far shied away from threatening concrete, internationally coordinated countermeasures, such as a halt to the “Northstream 2” project or exclusion from SWIFT payments, in the event that Russia does not cease its aggression against Ukraine. Consequently, there has also been sporadic criticism of the joint statement by the two countries. Critics, such as FDP foreign policy expert Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, accuse the German foreign minister of obscuring those actually responsible by using overly diplomatic wording and thus virtually inviting the Russian president to continue to exert a destabilizing influence on the situation in Ukraine. Norbert Röttgen (CDU) also warns that it should not remain with mere expressions of solidarity.

In fact, it is questionable whether Russia – especially if one starts from the theory of a “test balloon” – classifies this reaction as clear enough. If this were indeed a deployment for a larger offensive, there would be no effective military means on the Ukrainian side to oppose it, and a decisive response from the international community could hardly be expected in the short term. A commitment to provide Ukraine with defensive assets, such as anti-aircraft and anti-tank guided missiles, could at least raise the price of a possible Russian attack significantly. But even if the current deployment is just a bluff: There is a risk that Russia will use it to further fuel the current situation and use the alleged separatists to escalate the situation. In any case, Moscow has an interest in maintaining the open territorial conflict. The state of “stable instability” guarantees Russia that Ukraine’s accession to NATO, which President Selensky wants, will still not happen. But Putin also benefits domestically from a weakened Ukraine. As long as it remains unsuccessful, it serves as a cautionary tale against a change of policy in his own country.

Conversely, a clear commitment to further sanctions in the event of continued escalation could help to exert a moderating influence on Russia in particular. In the past, the Russian president has shown himself to be a cool-headed tactician who weighs his actions rationally and makes full use of the available framework for action. As long as the expected costs are lower than the benefits for Russia, he will continue to turn the spiral of escalation. Nevertheless, he too is subject to political constraints. His country has been hit hard by the Corona pandemic and currently has one of the highest excess mortality rates in the world – despite “Sputnik V.” The Russian economy is also doing badly. Compared with the previous year, the Russian Ruble has lost about 15% of its value against the euro. The president can therefore make good use of success stories – or a military distraction – in his own interest at the moment. After all, an aggravated economic crisis could considerably increase popular discontent, which had recently manifested itself in protests against the handling of Kremlin critic Navalny and the dismissal of a governor in the eastern metropolis of Khabarovsk, and thus also endanger Putin’s power. If Moscow is made to understand unequivocally that in the event of a military confrontation it will at least consistently exhaust all political and economic options, this would noticeably shift the cost/benefit ratio. This could possibly bring about a relenting and prevent an imminent military confrontation.

From a European perspective, this is not about a power struggle with Russia, but about the question of whether the EU is taken seriously as an actor – also because it is serious about its own commitments. What is more, it is about the question of whether international law should continue to apply in the future or whether the law of the strongest should take its place. If the latter were the case, we would not be able to avoid a stronger military presence in the long term. If, however, this question is unequivocally resolved in favour of international law, Russia too can once again be an integral part of the European community of states and a partner in international affairs. In this case, concrete and face-saving offers could be made in return for de-escalation, offering a chance to pick up torn threads of talks and seek a solution to the conflict within the framework of the Normandy format. But this would be the second step before the first. For now, the Western community must leave no doubt that it will stand by threatened Ukraine in an emergency – even if it has to pay its own price.